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THE PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR
SPORTS PROTECTION ACT (PASPA):
A BAD BET FOR THE STATES
Eric Meer*
ABSTRACT
Sports gambling is a multi-billion dollar industry in America today, but
state and local governments, by and large, do not benefit in any way.  The
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA), a 1992 federal law,
restricts all but a handful of states from legalizing sports gambling.  This has
allowed a thriving shadow economy of mob-associated bookies and offshore
websites to operate with virtual impunity.  PASPA’s restrictions have not
received much attention—until recently.  The severity of the recent recession
has forced state governments to get creative and find new sources of tax reve-
nue, and many states have turned to sports gambling as a solution to raise
additional revenues.  Unfortunately, PASPA limits them from legalizing, regu-
lating, and taxing the activity, which would enable state and local governments
to enjoy millions of dollars in new tax revenue, job growth, and increased
intrastate economic activity.
This Note explores the historical regulation of sports gambling in America
and the forces that gave rise to PASPA.  After analyzing the purported goals of
PASPA in light of present conditions, this Note concludes that it is evident that
PASPA has failed to accomplish those goals.  PASPA supports a thriving
shadow economy of illegal sports gambling providers, unfairly restricts the
sovereignty and economic freedom of the states, and makes detecting athlete
and referee bribery extremely difficult.  Therefore, PASPA is a bad bet for the
United States, and it should be repealed.
I. INTRODUCTION
In May 2009, Delaware Governor Jack Markell signed a bill that would
make Delaware the second state in the United States to have legalized, regu-
lated, and taxed sports betting on any professional and amateur American
sporting event, a decision intended to help close the projected $700 million
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deficit for the 2010 budget.1  The new venture was expected to generate
between $22.5 million and $30.6 million for Delaware’s General Fund2 from a
sports betting tax, higher food and beverage sales at state-sanctioned sport-
sbooks, and increased betting at the horse tracks, slots, and other games adja-
cent to the sportsbooks.
Delaware’s plan came to a screeching halt in late August of 2009, right
before the start of the NFL season, when the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit ruled that the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act
(“PASPA”)3 barred Delaware from implementing most of its proposed plan.4
The Circuit Court held that Delaware was restricted from offering single-game
bets and bets on any professional or amateur sporting event other than NFL
contests; the state could only allow multiple-bet wagers (“parlay” wagers) on
NFL games, the same scheme that existed in Delaware in 1976.5  At the case’s
conclusion, Andre Bouchard, the attorney representing Delaware, said that even
though the court ruled against Delaware, “there will still be legal betting in
Nevada, there will be illegal betting across the country including Delaware, and
there will be betting on the Internet.”6
Bouchard’s comments highlight three realities about the popularity of
sports gambling in America today, and the ease in which gambling providers
operate.  In a 1999 report, the National Gaming Impact Study Commission
(“NGISC”) found that American gamblers illegally wagered as much as $380
billion a year on sports.7  In 2008, Internet gaming was approximately a $20
billion industry, with sports betting representing a large and ever-growing por-
1 Chad Millman, Jack Markell is ready to legalize sports betting in Delaware.  The ramifi-
cations across the political landscape could be significant, ESPN.COM, http://
sports.espn.go.com/espnmag/story?id=3968082 (last visited Feb. 4, 2011); ESPN.COM NEWS
SERVICE, Sports betting now legal in Delaware, ESPN.COM (May 14, 2009, 1:37 PM), http://
sports.espn.com/espn/news/story?id=4166612.  This Note focuses on betting on the sporting
events of the four major professional North American sports leagues–the National Basket-
ball Association (NBA), the National Football League (NFL), the National Hockey League
(NHL), and Major League Baseball (MLB)–as well as betting on the sporting events of the
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA).  Other types of competitive betting, such
as horse racing and jai alai have a different regulatory framework and will not be considered.
2 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. DEP’T OF THE STATE OF DEL. OMB MEMORANDUM,
SPORTS BETTING REPORT AS PER HJR 10 OF THE 144TH GEN. ASSEM. 2, 12 (2008), available
at http://finance.delaware.gov/publications/sportsbetting.pdf [hereinafter DELAWARE SPORTS
BETTING REPORT].
3 28 U.S.C. §§  3701-3704 (2006).  This Act is also known as the Bradley Act.
4 Office of the Comm’r of Baseball v. Markell, 579 F.3d 293, 301-04 (3d Cir. 2009).
5 Id. at 304.
6 Jef Feeley & Phil Milford, Delaware Sports Betting Plan Challenged by Lawyers (Update
2), BLOOMBERG.COM (Aug. 24, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=210700
01&sid=aUMKSSrS3P2E.
7 NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N REPORT 2-14 (1999) available at http://
govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/finrpt.html [hereinafter NGISC REPORT].
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVG\2-2\NVG206.txt unknown Seq: 3 10-JAN-12 16:10
Fall 2011] PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS PROTECTION ACT 283
tion of the industry.8  Americans also legally wager $2.5 billion a year in
licensed Nevada sportsbooks.9
In light of these stark realities, PASPA continues to either prohibit or sub-
stantially limit almost every state from allowing state-sanctioned (or state-run)
sports betting.10  This Note argues that to have a sensible sports betting regula-
tory framework, the federal government should repeal PASPA and respect the
states’ rights to regulate and tax sports gambling if they so choose, while still
enforcing interstate violations of state law via existing federal enforcement
tools.  This Note focuses on the federal regulation of sports betting vis-a`-vis its
impact on state regulatory efforts and its overall impact on the American sports
bettor.
Part I is an overview of the major federal statutes governing sports betting.
Although Part I focuses on the laws of “offline” sports betting, it also briefly
touches on federal Internet sports betting regulation, an issue that has recently
garnered a great deal of media attention and legal scholarship.  The online
sports betting industry is analyzed because it directly impacts the ability of state
governments to offer competing forums for sports gambling.
Part II examines the purported goals of PASPA and whether those goals
have been realized in the eighteen years since its enactment.  By examining the
law’s legislative history, this Note concludes that it is plainly evident those
goals have not been met.
Part III analyzes the effects of repealing PASPA.  This section focuses
mainly on the economic effects, but it touches on the legal, political, and social
effects as well.
This Note, then, concludes by proposing a workable regulatory frame-
work, were PASPA repealed and replaced with a state-governed regime.  This
Note recommends that the federal government repeal PASPA and continue to
enforce any interstate violations of sports betting law under other existing fed-
eral statutes, while allowing each state to decide whether to prohibit or regulate
sports betting.
II. OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAW
American sports betting has existed since professional and amateur teams
and leagues were formally established and organized in the late nineteenth cen-
tury.11  By the early twentieth century, betting on sporting contests was “preva-
8 See Joe Drape, Web Site Puts Focus on the Fix in Sports Bets, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2008,
at A1 (estimating Internet gaming to surpass $20 billion in 2008); Fact Sheets: Industry
Issues, Sports Wagering, AM. GAMING ASS’N, http://www.americangaming.org/Industry/
factsheets/issues_detail.cfv?id=16 (last visited Feb. 6, 2011) (citing a Christiansen Capital
Advisors (CCA) study which tracks online sports betting as generating $4.29 billion in reve-
nues in 2005, more than double the $1.7 billion generated by online sports betting in 2001).
9 Michael Levinson, A Sure Bet: Why New Jersey Would Benefit From Legalized Sports
Wagering, 13 SPORTS LAW. J. 143, 144 (2006) (citing In re Grand Casinos, Inc., 2000 WL
34030564, at *12 (D. Minn. Mar. 28, 2000)).
10 See Millman, supra note 1.
11 DAVID G. SCHWARTZ, CUTTING THE WIRE: GAMBLING PROHIBITION AND THE INTERNET
29-30 (William R. Eadington ed., 2005).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVG\2-2\NVG206.txt unknown Seq: 4 10-JAN-12 16:10
284 UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2:281
lent” and a “widespread phenomena.”12  Although it was “never exactly legal,”
authorities did not bother to enforce the prohibition because the activity largely
consisted of casual bets amongst fans.13  The local and casual nature of sports
betting, however, soon became a popular national business that caught the fed-
eral government’s attention.14  During the middle of the twentieth century,
organized crime syndicates became the primary operators of sports gambling
schemes throughout the United States.15  These criminal operations were
sophisticated and worked across state lines, accepting wagers and passing along
betting information through phones and telegraphs, openly defying state
authorities.16
With state governments ill-equipped to combat these syndicates on their
own, then Attorney General, Robert Kennedy lobbied Congress to pass legisla-
tion to give the federal government the necessary tools and power to fight
organized crime and its control of illegal gambling.17  After intense pressure,
Congress yielded to Kennedy’s request and passed a series of laws—the Wire
Act,18 the Travel Act,19 the Interstate Transportation of Wagering Parapherna-
lia Act,20 and the Illegal Gambling and Business Act21—all analyzed below.
Furthermore, Congress has intermittingly stepped in and regulated intra-
state sports gambling activity.  The 1951 federal tax on Nevada sports betting22
and PASPA23—two controversial acts—are considered below.
Last, with the rise of the Internet and the subsequent growth of online
sports betting, Congress passed the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement
Act24 in 2006 to combat all forms of online gambling.
A. 1960s and 1970s Federal Sports Betting Legislation
During the 1960s and early 1970s, Congress enacted the Wire Act, the
Travel Act, the Interstate Transportation of Wagering Paraphernalia Act, and
the Illegal Gambling and Business Act to combat organized crime’s grip on
illegal sports gambling.25
12 Id.
13 Id. at 30.
14 Id. at 100.
15 Id. (citing Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate,
87th Congress, First Session, on S. 1653, S. 1654, S. 1655, S. 1656, S. 1657, S. 1658, S.
1665, 87th Cong., 6 (1961)).
16 Id. at 99.
17 Id. at 93-95.
18 See 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2006).
19 See id. § 1952 (2006).
20 See id. § 1953 (2006).
21 See id. § 1955 (2006).
22 RICHARD O. DAVIES & RICHARD G. ABRAM, BETTING THE LINE: SPORTS WAGERING IN
AMERICAN LIFE 122 (2001).
23 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3704 (2006).
24 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361-5367 (2006).
25 Kiran S. Raj, Drawing a Line in the Sand: How the Federal Government Can Work With
the States to Regulate Interstate Gambling, 56 EMORY L.J. 777, 783, 786-87 (2006-07);
Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 285 (1972) (citations omitted).
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1. The Wire Act
The Wire Act makes it a crime for anyone “being engaged in the business
of betting or wagering [to] knowingly use . . . a wire communication facility for
the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or infor-
mation assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or con-
test[.]”26  The law exempts the transmission of information to assist in the
placing of sports bets between two states that allow sports betting.27
In clarifying the reach of the law, Kennedy stated that:
[T]he Federal Government is not undertaking the almost impossible task of dealing
with all the many forms of casual or social wagering which so often may be effected
over communications.  It is not intended that the [Wire Act] should prevent a social
wager between friends by telephone.  This legislation can be a most effective weapon
in dealing with one of the major factors of organized crime in this country without
invading the privacy of the home or outraging the sensibilities of our people in mat-
ters of personal inclination and morals.28
The Act was not meant to affect a citizen’s ability to gamble on sports in
accordance with applicable state law, but was enacted solely to help state
authorities fight organized crime by disrupting their sports gambling
businesses.29
2. The Travel Act
Enacted the same year as the Wire Act, the Travel Act criminalizes travel-
ing or
us[ing] the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, with intent to . . .
(1) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity; or (2) commit any crime of vio-
lence to further any unlawful activity; or (3) otherwise promote, manage, establish,
carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on, of
any unlawful activity[.]30
Like the Wire Act, the Travel Act was enacted to help state authorities
combat organized crime’s control of illegal gaming.31  The Act only applies to
a “business enterprise” that continuously engages in an activity outlawed by
26 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2006).
27 Id. § 1084(b) (2006).
28 SCHWARTZ, supra note 11, at 100 (citing Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary
of the United States Senate, 87th Congress, First Session, on S. 1653, S. 1654, S. 1655, S.
1656, S. 1657, S. 1658, S. 1665, 87th Cong., 6 (1961)).
29 See Raj, supra note 25, at 784 (citing Tony Glover, Will Online Gaming Turn Out to Be a
Busted Flush?, SUNDAY BUS., Sept. 11, 2005, at 1) (stating that “one could argue that the
Wire Act had less to do with helping states enforce their ban on gambling than it did with
halting the growth of the criminal empires and organized crime syndicates that fed off gam-
bling”).  It is important to note that at the time of the Wire Act’s passage and in the time
since then, the evidence of organized crime’s monopolistic control of illegal sports betting is
arguably not as strong as it was over other gambling activities like illegal horse racing and
slots. SCHWARTZ, supra note 11, at 119-129.  The entrepreneurial, quasi-independent “book-
ies” or “bookmakers” that operate sports betting rings out of their own homes are major
players in the illegal sports betting world. Id. Nevertheless, because many bookmakers still
have some ties to organized crime, fighting the activity continues to remains a high priority
for law enforcement officials. Id.
30 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2006).
31 Raj, supra note 25, at 786 (citations omitted).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVG\2-2\NVG206.txt unknown Seq: 6 10-JAN-12 16:10
286 UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2:281
state or federal statute.32  Thus, gamblers placing bets with illegal business
enterprises are not subject to federal prosecution under the Travel Act.33
3. The Interstate Transportation of Wagering Paraphernalia Act
The Interstate Transportation of Wagering Paraphernalia Act criminalizes
the interstate or foreign transportation of “any record, paraphernalia, ticket, cer-
tificate, bills, slip, token, paper, writing, or other device used, or to be used, or
adapted, devised, or designed for use in (a) bookmaking; or (b) wagering pools
with respect to a sporting event; or (c) in a numbers, policy, bolita, or similar
game[.]”34  The Act attempts to “erect[ ] a substantial barrier to the distribution
of certain materials used in the conduct of various forms of illegal gambling”
by cutting off gambling supplies and thus has a more specific goal than its
companion statutes.35
4. The Illegal Gambling Business Act (IGBA)
IGBA targets large-scale illegal gambling activities and corrupt govern-
ment officials who facilitate them.36  IGBA criminalizes the operation of an
“illegal gambling business,” defined as any business that “(1) is a violation of
the law of a State political subdivision in which it is conducted, (2) involves
five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct or own
all or part of such business; and (3) has been or remains in substantially contin-
uous operation for a period in excess of thirty days or has a gross revenue of
$2,000 in any single day.”37  Like its predecessor statutes, IGBA does not con-
tain a provision that criminalizes the activities of individual bettors; rather, it
only targets the illegal operators.38
B. Federal Intervention in State Sports Betting Policy
Traditionally, state and local governments have regulated gambling, gam-
ing, and lotteries.39  In 1978, Congress reaffirmed this understanding when it
passed the Interstate Horseracing Act, clarifying that “the States should have
the primary responsibility for determining what forms of gambling may legally
take place within their borders[.]”40  Nevertheless, the federal government has
intervened twice in state gambling policy: in 1951, Congress imposed a tax on
Nevada sports gambling; and in 1992, the federal government banned almost
all states from sanctioning sports gambling.
32 Id. at 787 (citing CHARLES DOYLE, INTERNET GAMBLING: OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMI-
NAL LAW 11 (2003)).
33 Id.
34 18 U.S.C. § 1953 (2006).
35 Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 246 (1972) (citations omitted).
36 Raj, supra note 25, at 787 (citing Richard P. Shafer, Requirement of 18 U.S.C.A § 1955,
Prohibiting Illegal Gambling Business, That Such Businesses Involve Five or More Persons,
55 A.L.R. FED. 2 (2006)).
37 18 U.S.C. § 1955(b)(1) (2006).
38 United States v. King, 834 F.2d 109, 113 (6th Cir. 1987) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 91-1549,
91st Cong. (1970)) (placing a bet with an illegal gambling business is not illegal under the
IGBA, in light of the Congressional intent to attack the revenue sources of organized crime).
39 See 15 U.S.C. § 3001(a)(1) (2006).
40 Id.
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1. 1951 Federal Tax on Nevada Sports betting
In 1951, Congress imposed an annual fifty-dollar excise tax on bookmak-
ers and a ten-percent tax on all sports bets.41  The tax only impacted Nevada,42
the sole state to have any form of legalized sports betting.  Intending to discour-
age sports betting in the wake of a national basketball betting scandal, the tax
drove Nevada casinos out of the sports betting industry because it became too
unprofitable to offer the activity.43  Instead, the heavy tax allowed illegal
underground “turf clubs” to flourish, depriving local, state, and federal govern-
ments of substantial tax revenue.44  These clubs were shady enterprises that
often evaded the full tax in a number of crafty ways.45  Eventually, Congress
reduced the tax to two percent in 1974, and Nevada experienced an economic
boom as sports betting returned to profitable levels at state-sanctioned casinos,
while the federal government was able to collect its tax at the lower rate.46  The
incident taught federal policymakers an important lesson: Congress can try to
prohibit or discourage sports gambling, but underground bookmakers will con-
tinue to serve the public’s demand.47  It would be four decades before the fed-
eral government again involved itself in state sports betting policy.
2. Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA)
In 1992, Congress passed PASPA, also called the Bradley Act, named
after former basketball star and then-New Jersey Senator Bill Bradley, the bill’s
champion and sponsor.48  PASPA states:
It shall be unlawful for [either] . . . a governmental entity . . . or a person to sponsor,
operate, advertise, or promote, pursuant to the law or compact of a governmental
entity, a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme based,
directly or indirectly (through the use of geographical references or otherwise), on
one or more competitive games in which amateur or professional athletes participate,
or are intended to participate, or on one or more performances of such athletes in
such games.49
Although PASPA prohibits all state-sanctioned or state-run sports gam-
bling schemes, it carved out an exemption for any state that allowed or operated
a sports betting scheme at any time between 1976 and 1990.50  This
grandfathered the Nevada sportsbooks, the limited Oregon sports lottery, the
limited Delaware sports lottery, and the limited sports pool betting in Mon-
tana.51  It also provided a one-year window for New Jersey to legalize sports
betting, or else face PASPA prohibition.52
41 DAVIES & ABRAM, supra note 22, at 122.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 122-23.
44 Id. (citations omitted).
45 Id. at 123-25.
46 Id. at 127.  Congress eventually reduced the tax to .025% in 1983. Id. at 128.
47 See id. at 122-27.
48 S. REP. NO.102-248, at 4 (1992).
49 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2006).
50 Id. § 3704(a)(1) (2006).
51 Id.; David D. Waddell & Douglas L. Minke, Why Doesn’t Every Casino Have a Sports
Book?, GLOBAL GAMING BUS., July 9, 2008, at 36.
52 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a)(3) (2006).  Waddell & Minke, supra note 51, at 36.
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The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) was vehemently opposed to the legis-
lation.53  The DOJ was concerned that PASPA was a fundamental federal intru-
sion on the rights of the states to set their own gambling policy and to raise
revenues.54  The DOJ was also troubled that the law allowed amateur and pro-
fessional sports organizations to seek civil injunctions.55
PASPA’s legislative history reflects the law’s three basic goals: (1) to stop
the spread of state-sponsored sports gambling, (2) to maintain sports’ integrity,
and (3) to reduce the promotion of sports gambling among America’s youth.56
Before analyzing PASPA more thoroughly in Parts II and III, this part con-
cludes with an overview of sports gambling at the state level, and with a brief
discussion of Internet sports gambling regulation.
3. Sports Gambling Laws at the State Level
PASPA fully exempted Nevada and partially exempted Oregon, Delaware,
and Montana from the sports gambling prohibition.57  The other forty-six states
are completely prohibited from sanctioning or operating a professional or ama-
teur sports betting scheme.58  PASPA gave New Jersey the opportunity for an
exemption, but the state failed to meet the necessary standards in time.59  The
following summaries describe what type of sports betting federal law permits,
what type of betting currently exists at the state level, and recent legislative and
political developments at the state level.
a. Nevada
Nevada is the only state that offers the full-range of legal sports wagering
for all of the major professional and collegiate sports.60  The Nevada Gaming
Commission and the State Gaming Control Board regulate sports gambling
within the state.61
b. Oregon
From 1989 until 2007, Oregon operated a sports betting lottery called
“Sports Action” which allowed Oregonians to make parlay bets on NFL
games.62  However, on July 1, 2007, the Oregon Legislature repealed Sports
Action in an effort to attract collegiate basketball tournaments to its state.63
Part III discusses this repeal further.
53 See  S. REP. NO.102-248, at 12.
54 Id. at 13.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 4-5.
57 See 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a) (2006); Waddell & Minke, supra, note 51, at 36.
58 See 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a) (2006); Waddell & Minke, supra note 51, at 36.
59 Waddell & Minke, supra note 51, at 36.
60 Id. at 35.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.; see also Oregon Lottery, Sports ActionSM/Monday Night ScoreboardSM Q&A 1-2 (on
file with author).
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c. Delaware
In 1976, Delaware operated a sports betting scheme that allowed bettors to
place parlay bets on NFL games.64  The lottery was discontinued after the 1976
NFL season65 because it was not an economically viable program for the State
to maintain.66  In 2009, Delaware’s governor legalized Nevada-style sports bet-
ting but was blocked by the Third Circuit from implementing his plan in full.67
Due to the Third Circuit’s August 2009 ruling, Delaware is limited in what it
can offer.  The state cannot offer single-game betting or betting on sporting
contests other than NFL games, but it now offers parlay NFL betting on bets of
three or more NFL games, with some variation of the bet available as well.68
d. Montana
Montana voters have chosen to allow state-licensed sports pools, fantasy
sports leagues, and sports tab games.69  The referendum limits sports gambling
to only those types of schemes, and thus does not allow a Montana bettor to
place a bet on a single game or bundle of games.70
e. New Jersey
PASPA gave New Jersey a one-year window of opportunity to legalize
sports betting, but the state legislature was unable to forge a consensus and pass
the appropriate legislation in time.71  New Jersey, therefore, must comply with
PASPA’s restrictions72 even though it is considered a pioneer in the gaming
industry.  Recently, New Jersey has attempted to build momentum towards the
eventual legalization of sports betting through federal litigation, state legisla-
tion, and the voter referendum process.73
In March 2009, New Jersey State Senator Raymond Lesniack filed a law-
suit in the District of New Jersey claiming, among other things, that PASPA
unconstitutionally discriminates among the states by allowing four states to
offer sports betting while disallowing the other forty-six states from enjoying
64 Waddell & Minke, supra note 51, at 35.
65 Id. at 36.
66 Suzette Parmley and Joelle Farrell, Delaware Still Plans to Bet on NFL Games
PHILLY.COM, Aug. 26, 2009, http://articles.philly.com/2009-08-26/news/25276480_1_sports-
lottery-jack-markell-video-lottery (Delaware used a similar gaming scheme for one NFL sea-
son in 1976, but it was discontinued after disappointing results).
67 See supra notes 2-9 and accompanying text.
68 Katherine Santiago, Delaware Opens Sports Betting On Professional Football, NJ.COM
(Sept. 10, 2009 3:51 PM), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2009/09/
delaware_opens_betting_on_prof.html.
69 Waddell & Minke, supra note 51, at 35.
70 Id.; see also Amy Beth Hanson, NCAA clarifies sports betting policy; OK for Montana to
host playoffs, HELENAIR.COM, (Aug. 7, 2009 12:00 AM) http://helenair.com/sports/arti-
cle_e0150da9-0dab-55eb-8725-b688a9cd1be5.html (“State and university officials argued
that Montana law allows betting on fantasy sports leagues, not on the outcome of single
events, which was prohibited under NCAA rules.”  The NCAA concurred that this was in
fact the state’s policy.).
71 Waddell & Minke, supra note 51, at 36.
72 Id.
73 Id.
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the privilege.74  California State Senator Roderick Wright, who chairs his
state’s gambling committee, publicly announced that he supported the New
Jersey lawsuit as well.75  The case was dismissed in March 2011 for lack of
standing.76  Additionally, Lesniak successfully steered a proposed amendment
to the New Jersey state constitution through the Senate State Government,
Wagering, Tourism and Historic Preservation Committee, which would consti-
tutionally permit sports betting in New Jersey.77  If the full Senate approves the
change, New Jersey voters would be able to vote on a referendum whether to
accept the constitutional amendment, though the amendment is predicated on a
repeal of PASPA.78  Additionally, both houses of the New Jersey Legislature
have introduced resolutions calling on the United States Congress to repeal
PASPA.79
f. Other States
In January 2010, Rhode Island State Senators John Tassoni, John McBur-
ney, and James Doyle introduced a Joint Resolution calling on Congress to
repeal PASPA.80  In February 2010, using almost identical language, Missouri
State Representatives Jason Grill and Mike Colona also introduced a Joint Res-
olution calling on Congress to repeal PASPA.81  Although, as of this writing,
the resolutions have yet to pass their respective chambers, both are symbolic of
the growing dissatisfaction with PASPA at the state level.
In February 2010, a subcommittee in the Iowa State Senate approved a bill
legalizing sports betting, which now faces a vote in the full Senate.82  Even
though PASPA prohibition bars them from legalizing the activity, some state
senators are trying to drum up support for a federal repeal of the law.83
C. Internet Sports Gambling
For purposes of this Note, the federal regulatory framework that governs
Internet sports gambling is only briefly discussed.  Because this Note focuses
on the states’ ability to legalize sports betting at brick and mortar venues within
their respective jurisdictions, an extensive analysis of Internet sports gambling
74 Complaint at 18-20, Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n, Inc. v. Holder, No. 3:09-
cv-01301 (D. N.J. Mar. 23, 2009).
75 Patrick McGreevy, California May Benefit from Legalizing Sports Betting, State Senator
Says, L.A.TIMES.COM (Aug. 1, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/print/2010/aug/01/local/la-
me-sports-gambling-20100802.
76 Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n, Inc., No. 09-1301 (GEB) (D.N.J. Mar. 7,
2011).
77 Press Release, Jason Butkowski, Lesniak- Van Drew Constitutional Amendment to Allow
for Sports Wagering Advances, POLITICKERNJ.COM (Feb. 8, 2010), http://
vip.politickernj.com/jbutkowski/36689/lesniak-van-drew-constitutional-amendment-allow-
sports-wagering-advances.
78 Id.
79 Waddell & Minke, supra note 51, at 36.
80 S. J. Res. 2028, Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2010).
81 H.R. Con. Res. 22, 95th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2010) [hereinafter Missouri
Resolution].
82 Jennifer Jacobs, Iowa Lawmakers Back Bill for Pro Sports Gambling, USATODAY.COM,
(Feb. 4, 2010), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/2010-02-04-iowa-sports-gambling_N.htm.
83 Id.
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legislation is not necessary.  However the rise of the online sports gambling
industry, despite the federal prohibition, is a key factor to this Note’s argument:
as the industry continues to grow and attract the American sports bettor’s dol-
lar, the states are continuously unable to compete for this business through their
own legalized land-based sportsbooks while subject to PASPA prohibition.
It is a federal crime to operate an online gambling website, but by all
accounts the federal government has failed to curb the rise of the ever-growing
business.84  The industry’s regulatory and economic structure is considered
below.
1. Wire Act, Travel Act, and IGBA
Before 2006, federal authorities could use the Wire Act, the Travel Act,
and IGBA to prohibit the operation of Internet gambling websites.85  A few
courts held that sports betting websites violate the Wire Act, because the
Internet is a wire facility and these websites are “in the business of” transmit-
ting bets or betting information.86  The Travel Act and IGBA would likely also
prohibit sports gambling website operators, but no court has opined on the
matter.87
However, these three acts proved to be inadequate to prosecute the full-
range of online gaming for two reasons: (1) contrary to the Department of Jus-
tice’s stance, federal courts held that the Wire Act only applied to sports betting
and not to other forms of online betting, and (2) many online betting sites are
located offshore beyond the jurisdictional reach of U.S. courts.88  From 1993 to
2003, Congress made multiple attempts to address Internet gambling and cure
these deficiencies before finally enacting the Unlawful Internet Gambling
Enforcement Act of 2006.89
84 Matthew Garrahan, Push to Reform US Online Gambling Laws, FT.COM, (Mar. 26, 2011,
2:59 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/28abad3c-570e-11e0-9035-00144feab49a.html#axzz1I
6ONs231 (“Although millions of Americans play online poker, it is illegal to own or operate
a site from within the US, which means the biggest companies are all based off-shore.”)
85 Brant M. Leonard, Note, Highlighting the Drawbacks of the UIGEA: Proposed Rules
Reveal Heavy Burdens, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 515, 515 (2009) (citations omitted).
86 In United States v. Cohen, 260 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2001), the Second Circuit found Jay
Cohen, owner and president of an Antigua-based sportsbook website, guilty of violations of
the Wire Act. Id. at 73-78.  The court held that the Internet is a type of wire facility, and the
website “marketed [itself] to the public for the express purpose of transmitting [sports] bets
and betting information.” Id. at 76.  In In re MasterCard Int’l Inc., 313 F.3d 257 (5th Cir.
2002), the Fifth Circuit stated that the Wire Act’s prohibition applied only to betting on
sports, and thus affirmed grant of summary judgment to the plaintiffs who facilitated online
betting transactions for non-sports bets. Id. at 263.
87 The Travel Act would seemingly prohibit operators of Internet sports betting websites
provided they violate a state antigambling law, since such operators are a “business enter-
prise involving gambling” and the Internet can easily be classified as a “facility in interstate
or foreign commerce.”  Leonard, supra note 85, at 521 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)-(b)
(2006)).  Similarly, the IGBA would criminalize such operations if it is found to be an “ille-
gal gambling business” in accordance with the statute’s requirements. Id. at 521-22 (citing
18 U.S.C. § 1955(a) (2006)).
88 Id. at 522-23 (citing In re Mastercard Int’l Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 468, 480-81 (E.D. La.
2001), aff’d 313 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2002)).
89 Id. at 525.
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2. Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 (UIGEA)
Congress sought to rectify the uncertainties that existed in the online gam-
ing regulatory system by passing the UIGEA, a last-minute attachment to the
SAFE Port Act, a port security bill.90  It appears that few legislators read the
bill’s language and provisions, and the law has subsequently garnered a vast
amount of criticism.91
The UIGEA has three important provisions.  First, the Act makes it a
crime for a “person engaged in the business of betting or wagering [to] know-
ingly accept, in connection with the participation of another person in unlawful
Internet gambling[,]” a financial transaction including credit and electronic
fund transfers.92  Thus, the UIGEA makes it a crime for Internet betting sites to
accept bets, with some minor exceptions.93
Second, the UIGEA requires all U.S. financial institutions, including
banks, credit card companies, and e-wallet services, to prohibit funding Internet
gaming financial transactions, mandating these financial institutions to set up
procedures to reasonably identify and block such transactions.94  The UIGEA
instructs the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Attorney General to prescribe regu-
lations to guide financial institutions with these procedures.95
Last, the UIGEA gives U.S. district courts jurisdiction to prohibit transac-
tions related to illegal Internet gambling.96  The DOJ and state attorney general
can sue in federal court to restrict Internet service providers from allowing ille-
gal Internet gambling transactions to operate.97  This provision tries to cure the
jurisdictional drawback that existed in the previous legal framework by giving
federal judges the ability to remove the illegal websites altogether.98
Thus, the UIGEA attempts to restrict Internet gambling by regulating the
financial institutions that facilitate the business and the websites that run the
operations,99 leaving gamblers immune from prosecution.  Though enforce-
90 Leonard, supra note 85, at 527; see also Jonathan Weisman, Internet Gambling, Ports
Deal Reached, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2006, at A8.
91 See, e.g., I. Nelson Rose, Viewpoint: The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of
2006 Analyzed, 10 GAMING L. REV. 537, 538 (2006) (arguing the language of UIGEA is
actually an impediment to curing the Wire Act’s deficiencies); Nicholas M. Wajda, Note,
Over-Playing a Weak Hand: Why Giving Individual States a Choice is a Better Bet for
Internet Gambling in the United States, 29 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 313, 328-29 (2007) (point-
ing out the obvious loopholes that will render the UIGEA ineffective); see generally Leo-
nard, supra note 85, at 529-36 (describing how the UIGEA restricts the government from
collecting a large amount of tax revenue, is difficult to enforce, is at odds with the rest of the
world’s stance, and places a significant burden on United States financial institutions).
92 31 U.S.C. § 5363 (2006).
93 Leonard, supra note 85, at 527.
94 31 U.S.C. § 5364(a)  (2006).
95 Id.  Leonard, supra note 85, at 527 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 5364 (2006)).
96 31 U.S.C. § 5365(a) (2006); Leonard supra note 85, at 528 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 5365
(2006)).
97 31 U.S.C. § 5365(b)(1)(A),(2)(A) (2006); Leonard supra note 85, at 528 (citing I. Nelson
Rose, Viewpoint: The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 Analyzed, 10
GAMING L. REV. 537, 540 (2006)).
98 Leonard, supra note 85, at 528.
99 Id. at 526-28.
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ment officials have not yet utilized the UIGEA, many leading gaming commen-
tators believe that the statute’s loopholes will make the law ineffective.100
In July 2010, the effort to repeal a large part of the UIGEA passed a sig-
nificant hurdle, as the House Committee on Financial Services approved the
Internet Gambling Regulation, Consumer Protection and Enforcement Act.101
However, the bill would keep the prohibition on Internet sports gambling in
place, while legalizing other forms of online gambling, such as poker.102  As of
this writing, the bill is still being taken up in the House of Representatives, but
the outcome remains unclear.103
A thorough analysis of Internet sports betting policy is beyond the scope
of this Note’s analysis, but it is important to recognize that Internet gambling is
a booming multi-billion dollar industry.104
Americans have a voracious appetite for sports betting, whether it is on the
Internet, through bookies, or at casinos.  Illegal providers will continue to
appease the public’s demand105 and are willing to openly defy federal prohibi-
tions.  Though the UIGEA and PASPA are part of the federal government’s
broader efforts to eradicate sports gambling, they impact their targets differ-
ently: Internet gambling websites are privately-run foreign businesses that have
little problem profiting from blatant violations of the UIGEA, while state gov-
ernments are sovereign entities that cannot and will not violate PASPA.
PASPA enables bookies to step into the void by illegally accepting offline bets,
operating alongside their illegal online counterparts in America’s multi-billion
dollar shadow sports gambling economy.
III. ANALYZING PASPA’S EFFECTIVENESS
PASPA attempted to: (1) stop the spread of state-sanctioned or state-run
sports gambling, (2) maintain sport’s integrity, and (3) reduce the promotion of
sports gambling among America’s youth.106  Whether any of these goals have
been realized is a matter of debate.
A. Stopping the Spread of Sports Gambling
PASPA certainly has stopped the spread of state-sanctioned and state-run
sports gambling because it restricts any state, other than the four exempted
ones, from legalizing the activity.107  In fact, the spread has reversed, with Ore-
100 See John Helyar, New anti-gambling law won’t stop online bettors, ESPN.COM (Oct. 3,
2006), http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/news/story?id=2611872 (quoting leading gaming com-
mentator I. Nelson Rose as stating, the UIGEA “will have very minor effects” and law
Professor Joseph Kelly stating the UIGEA is “highly unenforceable”); see also supra note
91 and accompanying text.
101 Bill Ordine, The Smart Money: Internet gambling bill takes a step, THE PHIL. INQUIRER,
July 30, 2010, at D1.
102 Id.
103 Javad Heydary, New Bill Gives Online Gambling Another Chance, TECHNEWSWORLD,
(Mar. 30, 2011, 5:00 AM), http://www.technewsworld.com/story/72147.html.
104 Drape, supra note 8, at A1.
105 See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
106 S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 4-5 (1992).
107 See 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2006); Waddell & Minke, supra note 51, at 35.
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gon abandoning its sports lottery in 2007.108  By restricting the ability of states
to offer sanctioned sports betting, however, PASPA’s larger purpose generally
was to “keep sports gambling from spreading.”109  On this count, supporters
and critics alike would agree that PASPA has utterly failed.110
Any American bettor who wishes to place a bet on a sporting event today
has many available avenues.  Casual wagers between friends and coworkers are
an American tradition, especially during the NFL’s Super Bowl111 and the
NCAA March Madness Basketball Tournament.112  In addition, risk-seeking
bettors often turn to their neighborhood bookie to place a wide variety of
bets.113  Bettors can also book a trip to Nevada and gamble on any team in any
sport, professional or amateur, to his or her heart’s (and wallet’s) delight.114
Moreover, a bettor can now take a trip to Delaware and place parlay bets on
NFL games, the most popular sport to bet on.115  Sports bettors can also conve-
niently hop online and make any bet on any team in any sport.116  Further, there
is arguably no federal law (and almost no state law) that bars an individual
from placing these bets.117  It is quite clear that PASPA’s underlying aim—
curbing the spread of sports gambling by reducing the providers—has not suc-
ceeded because the demand is so strong.  Illegal providers have recognized this
and profit from the virtual blanket prohibition on the states.
108 Waddell & Minke, supra note 51, at 35.
109 S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 5.
110 See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
111 Fact Sheets: Industry Issues, Sports Wagering, AM. GAMING ASS’N, http://
www.americangaming.org/Industry/factsheets/issues_detail.cfv?id=16 (last visited Feb. 6,
2011) (“of the total amount bet on the Super Bowl, only about 1.5 percent is wagered
legally”; approximately $81.5 million was wagered legally in Nevada sportsbooks in 2009).
While he did not place a wager, President Barack Obama has gotten into the predicting act,
correctly picking the Pittsburgh Steelers as the 2009 Super Bowl champion.  Christina Bel-
lantoni, Obama picks Pittsburgh for Super Bowl, THE WASH. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2009), http://
www.washingtontimes.com/weblogs/bellantoni/2009/Jan/29/obama-picks-pittsburgh-for-
super-bowl/.
112
“The FBI estimates more than $2.5 billion a year is illegally wagered on March Mad-
ness[,]” while between $80 million and $90 million is bet each year in Nevada sportsbooks.
Fact Sheets: Industry Issues, Sports Wagering, AM. GAMING ASS’N, http://
www.americangaming.org/Industry/factsheets/issues_detail.cfv?id=16 (last visited Feb. 6,
2011).  President Obama also filled out a 2009 March Madness bracket on ESPN, correctly
predicting the North Carolina Tar Heels as the men’s basketball champions. See Andy Katz,
Presidential pick ‘em at the White House, ESPN.COM, Mar. 28, 2009, http://sports.espn.go.
com/ncb/ncaatourney09/columns/story?columnist=katz_andy&id=3991859.  Even former
Chief Justice William Rehnquist reportedly organized an annual March Madness pool for
money.  Chad Millman, Fight For Sports Betting Rages On, ESPN.com, (Jan. 21, 2010 7:27
AM), http://insider.espn.go.com/insider/insider/news/story?id=4841822.
113 See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 11, at 119-29.
114 Waddell & Minke, supra note 51, at 35.
115 Santiago, supra note 68.
116 See Leonard, supra note 85, at 515; see also SPORTSBOOK.COM.
117 See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text. See also Susan Powell, Online Poker and
Gambling to Become Legal in The US?, THE DAILY PLANET DISPATCH, Mar. 28, 2011, http:/
/dailyplanetdispatch.com/online-poker-and-gambling-to-become-legal-in-the-us/857431/
(discussing the debate as to whether online gambling is actually illegal from the gambler’s
perspective).
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Much has changed in the gaming world in the eighteen years since PASPA
was enacted.  In 1992, when American public sentiment appeared to be against
any type of legalized gambling, only two states—New Jersey and Nevada—
permitted casino gambling.  Today, more than a dozen states have casinos, and
dozens more have Indian reservation casinos, lotteries, and other forms of gam-
bling.118  The Internet has made all types of gambling, including sports gam-
bling, easily accessible.119  Thousands of articles a year are written analyzing
sports betting techniques and strategies, and television commentators and sports
radio disc jockeys openly discuss sports betting trends and predictions.120  In
short, our culture today is much more accepting of all types of gambling,
including sports gambling.  Stopping “sports gambling from spreading” is an
outdated and unrealistic goal.  PASPA should be repealed so that governments
can profit from the insatiable demand while legitimizing the wrongly maligned
suppliers.  In a capitalist system, it is bad national policy to prohibit such a
booming industry.
B. Maintaining Sports’ Integrity
The concern that the integrity of professional and amateur sports games
could be tainted by legalized sports gambling also prompted PASPA’s pas-
sage.121  Paul Tagliabue, former commissioner of the NFL, testified before
Congress:
Sports gambling threatens the character of team sports.  Our games embody our very
finest traditions and values.  They stand for clean, healthy competition.  They stand
for teamwork.  And they stand for success through preparation and honest effort.
With legalized sports gambling, our games instead will come to represent the fast
buck, the quick fix, the desire to get something for nothing.  The spread of legalized
sports gambling would change forever—and for the worse—what our games stand
for and the way they are perceived.
Sports gambling threatens the integrity of, and public confidence in, amateur and
professional sports.  Widespread legalization of sports gambling would inevitably
promote suspicion about controversial plays and lead fans to think “the fix was in”
whenever their team failed to beat the point-spread.122
By and large this remains the public stance of the NFL, MLB, NHL, and
NCAA, all of whom publicly supported PASPA’s enactment.123  However,
many critics believe this is a hypocritical stance since the leagues benefit from
118 Fact Sheets, States with Gaming, AM. GAMING ASS’N, http://www.americangaming.org/
Industry/factsheets/general_info_detail.cfv?id=15 (last visited Feb. 11, 2011).
119 See generally Drape, supra note 8, at A1, A12; see generally Mark Griffiths, Internet
gambling: issues, concerns, and recommendations, CYBERPSYCHOL. BEHAV., Dec. 2003, at
557, 557-68.
120 For example, Bill Simmons, a popular columnist on ESPN.com, writes a weekly NFL
column picking winners and losers against the point spread for every game. Bill Simmons,
Sports Guy’s World, ESPN.COM, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/page2/simmons/index (last
visited Feb. 7, 2011).
121 S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 5 (1992).
122 Id.
123 Id. at 3, 8.
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sports bettors’ interest and enjoy extremely profitable relationships with media
companies who publicize the weekly betting lines.124
Despite PASPA’s best efforts, the legitimacy of professional and amateur
sporting events is still frequently called into question.  Nowhere is this more
evident than in the events that transpired during the 2007 NBA season.125  Ex-
NBA referee Tim Donaghy worked in the league for thirteen years until federal
officials discovered that he was betting on games, including games he offici-
ated, during the latter part of his officiating career.126  Donaghy’s gambling
was linked to the Gambino mafia family, and he stated on national television
that the mafia threatened members of his family if he did not give them his
betting picks.127  Donaghy was eventually sentenced to fifteen months in prison
on charges of conspiracy to engage in wire fraud and transmitting betting infor-
mation through interstate commerce; he was released in late 2009.128  A public
nightmare for the NBA and its image, the event magnified not only the inability
of one of the major professional leagues to police its own insiders but also the
inability of PASPA to protect professional sports’ integrity.129
The incident also forced league commissioner David Stern, an early pro-
ponent of PASPA, to finally rethink his public stance on sports betting.130  In
late 2009, when asked if it was in the best interest of the NBA to support the
124 Many Internet articles are written for nationally recognized sports media websites, such
as ESPN.com, whose parent companies also have multibillion-dollar television contracts
with the leagues to broadcast their games.  In a letter to NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell,
Delaware Governor Markell pointed out the NFL’s contradictory stance against legalized
sports gambling by stating, “the NFL negotiates contracts with all of the principal broadcast
networks and those contracts generate billions of dollars in revenues for the NFL and the
team owners.  Importantly, each of these companies owns and operates websites that provide
the betting lines which are viewed by bettors in every state in the nation, regardless of
whether the viewers in that State can legally wager on the games. . . . Presumably the NFL’s
decision to allow ESPN and other parties with which the NFL contracts to promote gambling
on NFL games reflects your belief that the value of the NFL franchise is enhanced by that
programming.  In short, the notion that the NFL has aggressively and actively fought against
betting on its games is belied by the very programming the NFL indirectly endorses and
from which it handsomely profits.”  Letter from Jack A. Markell, Delaware Governor, to
Roger Goodell, NFL Commissioner, (Mar. 26, 2009) [hereinafter Markell Letter], available
at http://www.delawareonline.com/assets/pdf/BL131701329.PDF.  Markell also pointed out
that “[t]he NFL also contracts with ESPN to broadcast [the] NFL’s premier game, Monday
Night football, and the network programming includes both Hank Goldberg (the “Pigskin
Prognosticator”) and Chris Berman (the “Swami”), both of which (sic) offer their analysis
and predictions of each game with the spread.” Id.
125 Donaghy sentenced to 15 months in prison in gambling scandal, ESPN.COM (July 30,
2008 1:53 AM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=3509440 [hereinafter
ESPN.COM NEWS SERVICES].
126 Ex-NBA Ref Tim Donaghy’s Personal Foul, 60 Minutes: Disgraced Ref Talks About
Betting Scandal, The Mob, And How He Got Caught, CBSNEWS.COM (Dec. 6, 2009), http://
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/12/03/60minutes/main5880547.shtml (printed version of a
prior CBS Television Broadcast from Dec. 3, 2009).
127 Id.
128 Id. (“Donaghy spent 11 months of his sentence in prison and was released last month”).
129 See id; see also ESPN.COM NEWS SERVICES, supra note 125.
130 Ian Thomsen, Inside the NBA, Weekly Countdown: Stern Open to Legalized Betting,
Rule Changes, SI.COM (Dec. 11, 2009 2:26 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2009/writ-
ers/ian_thomsen/12/11/weekly.countdown/index.html.
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legalization of sports betting, Stern replied that “[i]t has been a matter of league
policy to answer that question, ‘No,’ . . . [b]ut I think that that league policy
was formulated at a time when gambling was far less widespread—even
legally.”131  Stern also acknowledged that the NBA can no longer be morally
opposed to the activity since so many state governments don’t consider it
immoral.”132  He also went as far as saying that, “it’s now a matter of national
policy: Gambling is good . . . [W]e have moved to a point where th[e] leap [of
accepting legalized sports gambling on NBA games] is a possibility[.]”133
Stern also acknowledged the possibility of sports betting as a new stream of
revenue for his league.134
If one of the premier professional sports leagues now publicly supports
legalized sports gambling, then the federal government should revisit the possi-
bility of reforming its national gambling policy.  With serious problems con-
fronting the United States today, sports betting no longer seems like a “wrong”
worth combating or enforcing.  Moreover, the increasing use of steroids and
performance enhancing drugs in sports arguably threatens the integrity of the
games135 more than sports gambling ever has.  Congress should reconsider
PASPA in light of today’s social mores and shifting attitudes.
C. Reducing the Promotion of Sports Gambling Among America’s Youth
Congress also claimed that PASPA was necessary because “[s]tate sanc-
tioned sports gambling will promote gambling among our Nation’s young peo-
ple.”136  Congress was primarily concerned with the proliferating technology
“that makes sports gambling ‘more convenient’ and ‘highly seductive’ to chil-
dren.”137  Congress believed that “[g]overnments should not be in the business
of encouraging people, especially young people, to gamble.”138
Two glaring weaknesses lie in this reasoning.  First, there are more ave-
nues today for young people to bet on sports than ever before.139  Young adults
are just a few clicks away from betting on sports during their seven hours of
daily Internet browsing time.140  Sports betting pools are also quite common
throughout America’s schools.141  Restricting the states’ ability to legalize
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 See Robert Schlesinger, Steroids, Baseball and the Hall of Fame, USNEWS.COM (July
26, 2009), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/robert-schlesinger/2009/07/26/steroids-
baseball-and-the-hall-of-fame.html (pointing to the effect of illegal steroids on the integrity
of sports).
136 S. REP. No. 102-248, at 5 (1992).
137 Id. at 5.
138 Id.
139 See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
140 Tamar Lewin, If Your Kids are Awake, They’re Probably Online, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20,
2010, at A1 (stating that “[t]hose ages 8 to 18 spend more than seven and a half hours a day
with [electronic and Internet] devices”).
141 See Jeff Roberts, Teen bookies, bettors roam school hallways, NORTHJERSEY.COM
(Dec. 6, 2009 10:23 AM), http://www.northjersey.com/news/education/gambling120509.
html (stating that “experts say sports gambling by teenagers has infiltrated every high school
in the state”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVG\2-2\NVG206.txt unknown Seq: 18 10-JAN-12 16:10
298 UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2:281
sports gambling does nothing to stop these activities from taking place.  Fur-
ther, state legalization would not increase the activity among America’s youths
because state-sanctioned or state-run venues would certainly have strictly-
enforced minimum age requirements, much in the same manner as venues that
host lotteries, pari-mutuel betting, casinos, and slots.142  Such requirements do
not put governments in “the business of encouraging [young] people . . . to
gamble.”143
Second, Congress was worried that young people would find “new tech-
nologies” that promoted sports gambling “highly seductive[,]” while making
the activity more “convenient for children[ ]” to participate in.144  Since 1992,
new technologies have proliferated in the hands of young people.145  PASPA
has not curbed young people’s access to such technologies, and a repeal of
PASPA would not suddenly lead to a surge in sports betting on high-tech
devices among the nation’s youth.  Instead, governments should promulgate
rules that regulate the ability of technologies to offer sports bets, while
allowing the larger adult public to gamble at legal venues.146
Youth gambling is a serious problem that should be confronted, but not
through an outright prohibition on the entire public.  PASPA has not helped the
problem, and its repeal will not compound it.  Instead, Congress and state gov-
ernments should address the issue of youth gambling through smarter and more
focused regulations.
IV. THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF REPEALING PASPA
It is time for Congress to re-evaluate PASPA in light of its goals and the
realities of the sports gambling industry today.  Were PASPA repealed, many
states may presumably continue to ban sports betting.147  However, those states
that elect to legalize and regulate the activity will enjoy a number of economic
benefits.148  Additionally, legitimizing the activity results in greater trans-
parency and an increased ability to detect misconduct.149
A. Potential Growth of State-Sponsored Sports Betting
The Senate Judiciary Committee Report on PASPA stated that, “[w]ithout
Federal legislation, sports gambling is likely to spread on a piecemeal basis
[through state-instituted legislation] and ultimately develop an irreversible
momentum.”150  Though this prediction may have some legitimate concerns,
enough constraints exist to limit unchecked nationwide growth.
142 Minimum Age to Gamble in the United States, WORLD CASINO DIRECTORY, http://
www.worldcasinodirectory.com/gambling_age_chart.htm. (last visited Feb. 4, 2011).
143 See S. REP. 102-248, at 5 (1992).
144 Id.
145 See e.g., Lewin, supra note 140, at A1, A3.
146 Sports bettors can now gamble on hand-held devices the size of smart-phones in real
time; a new technology that many believe has a lucrative future.  Matt Villano, In Las Vegas,
Sports Books in a Pocket, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2009, at B1, B6.
147 See infra Part IV.A.
148 See infra Part IV.B.
149 See infra Part IV.C.
150 S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 5 (1992).
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1. State Laws and State Constitutions as Constraints
At common law, three elements are necessary for an illegal betting lottery:
(1) the distribution of prizes; (2) according to chance; (3) for a consideration.151
American courts have interpreted the second element to require that the lottery
be one where chance is the “dominant factor,” so that lotteries that have a small
element of skill involved still fall under the legal definition of lottery.152
At common law, sports betting lottery easily meets the first and third ele-
ments, because gamblers stake a given sum of money on sporting contests for
the opportunity to win more money.153  Additionally, most courts at common
law held that sports betting lotteries were predominated by chance rather than
skill.154  These courts reasoned that the winner of a sports bet is determined by
the outcome of the game, which is determined in turn by:
a function of myriad factors such as the weather, the health and mood of the players,
and the condition of the playing field. Some educated predictions can be made about
each of these but each is also subject to last minute changes and to an element of the
unknowable, or to put it another way, to an element of chance.155
Almost all states have adopted statutes resembling the common law’s defi-
nition when crafting their sports gambling prohibitions.156  While a few states
target individual bettors, almost all state statutes target the bookmakers or
151 Affiliated Enters. Inc. v. Waller, 5 A.2d 257, 259 (Del. Super. Ct. 1939) (citing State v.
Emerson, 1 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. 1927)).
152 Nat’l Football League v. Governor of Delaware, 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1383-84 (D. Del.
1977) (citations omitted) (stating that “over the last ten years the trend towards acceptance of
the dominant fact rule . . . has continued and expanded” and citing to court decisions in New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Alaska, and California).
153 See Jon Boswell, Note, Fantasy Sports: A Game of Skill That is Implicitly Legal Under
State Law, and Now Explicitly Legal Under Federal Law, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J.
1257, 1263 (2008) (“Since consideration and prize elements are present in a typical fantasy
league, where participants pay an entry fee with the understanding that they will win a prize
if they win their league, under most state laws, the legality of such leagues turns on whether
the leagues’ outcomes depend on the requisite level of chance.”  The same logic applies to
sports betting, where participants stake a sum of money with the understanding that they will
win more money if they win their bet.).
154 Nat’l Football League, 435 F. Supp. at 1385.
155 Id.  The statement particularly holds true for parlay gambling since “the element of
chance that enters each is multiplied by [the number of games betted on within the parlay
bet].” Id.  However, controversy exists as to whether a single-game bet is considered to be a
bet of chance or skill. In re Request of the Governor for an Advisory Opinion, 2009 WL
1475736, at *8 (Del. May 29, 2009).  In its advisory opinion to Governor Markell, the Dela-
ware Supreme Court stated, “wide areas of disagreement exist between studies, and internal
inconsistencies within studies, addressing single game betting and the issue of whether
chance or skill predominates.” Id.
156 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 712-1220(4) (1973) (defining gambling as “stak[ing] or
risk[ing] something of value upon the outcome of a contest of chance or a future contingent
event not under [the gambler’s] control or influence[.]”). TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-501(1)
(2009) (“[g]ambling is contrary to the public policy of this state and means risking anything
of value for a profit whose return is to any degree contingent on chance[.]”). MICH. COMP
LAWS § 750.301 (2003) (“[a]ny person  . . . who, directly or indirectly, takes, receives, or
accepts from any person any money . . .with the agreement, understanding or allegation that
any money . . . will be paid or delivered to any person . . .  contingent upon the result of any
race, contest, or game or upon the happening of any event not known by the parties to be
certain, is guilty of a misdemeanor[.]”).
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bookies that accept bets from the public.157  Some state constitutions take a
strong stand and completely prohibit the state legislature from enacting state-
sanctioned or state-run sports gambling legislation.158  Other state constitutions
require voter approval for legalization.159  In almost all states, the legislature
would be required to pass a law to legalize sports gambling.160  Enacting such
laws may be politically difficult, especially in states where such a move may be
unpopular.161  Although the repeal of PASPA would certainly provide an
opportunity for states to legalize sports gambling, each state would still be
required to comply with statutory and constitutional restrictions while muster-
ing the necessary legislative votes to approve a state-run or state-sanctioned
scheme.162
Sports gambling would likely spread on a “piecemeal basis” were PASPA
repealed.  Delaware’s recent legislative battle and the recent actions of New
Jersey, Missouri, Rhode Island, Iowa, and California signal that at least a hand-
ful of states are ready and willing to consider instituting legalized sports gam-
bling in their states.163  However, there is no evidence that this would cause an
“irreversible momentum” across the country.  Enough political, social, statu-
tory, constitutional, and procedural hurdles exist that would eventually slow the
momentum.164  Nevertheless, a state that can successfully institute a profitable,
safe, and transparent system can serve as a template for other states that wish to
157 See, e.g., N.Y PENAL LAW § 225.00(9) (McKinney 1994) (defining bookmaking as
“advancing gambling activity by unlawfully accepting bets from members of the public as a
business, rather than in a casual or personal fashion, upon the outcomes of future contingent
events.”). ALA. CODE § 13A-12-20 (2) (1977) (defining bookmaking as “advancing gam-
bling activity by unlawfully accepting bets from members of the public as a business, rather
than in a casual or personal fashion, upon the outcome of future contingent events.”).
158 See, e.g., UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 27 (“[t]he Legislature shall not authorize any game of
chance, lottery or gift enterprise under any pretense or for any purpose.”). CAL. CONST. art.
IV § 19 (“[t]he Legislature has no power to authorize lotteries, and shall prohibit the sale of
lottery tickets in the State[,]”; “The Legislature has no power to authorize, and shall prohibit,
casinos of the type currently operating in Nevada and New Jersey”).
159 See, e.g., N.J. CONST. art. IV § 7 ¶ 2 (“[n]o gambling of any kind shall be authorized by
the Legislature unless the specific kind, restrictions and control thereof have been heretofore
submitted to, and authorized by a majority of the votes cast by, the people at a special
election or shall hereafter be submitted to, and authorized by a majority of the votes cast
thereon by[.]”); MONT. CONST. art. III § 9 (“[a]ll forms of gambling, lotteries, and gift enter-
prises are prohibited unless authorized by acts of the legislature or by the people through
initiative or referendum.”).
160 See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. I § 9 (“no lottery or the sale of lottery tickets, pool-selling,
book-making, or any other kind of gambling, except lotteries operated by the state and the
sale of lottery tickets in connection therewith as may be authorized and prescribed by
the legislature[.]”); IDAHO CONST. art. III § 20 cl. 1 (“[g]ambling is contrary to public policy
and is strictly prohibited except for  . . . [a] state lottery which is authorized by the state if
conducted in conformity with enabling legislation[.]”).
161 See Campbell Robertson, Video Bingo Has Alabamians Yelling Everything But, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 12, 2009, at A16, A21 (highlighting how many Alabama citizens, government
officials, district attorneys and preachers opposed legalizing video bingo because of the pub-
lic’s moral stance on gaming issues).
162 See supra notes 156-160 and accompanying text.
163 See supra Part II.B.3.
164 See supra notes 147-149 and accompanying text.
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pass similar legislation.  Congress must consider these implications in repealing
PASPA.
2. Outside Economic Constraints on States
Governments may find that legalizing sports gambling is an economically
unappealing option, even if given the legal opportunity.  State governments
compete to recruit professional franchises and amateur sports tournaments to
play in their cities, because these are lucrative opportunities.165  The profes-
sional and amateur sports leagues are highly opposed to the spread of any legal-
ized sports gambling and lobby hard for its prohibition.166  The leagues exert a
significant amount of leverage over states that consider legalizing sports betting
by threatening to bar any professional franchise or collegiate tournament from
competing or appearing in their state.167  In light of this tradeoff, state govern-
ments must weigh their economic alternatives: either legalize sports gambling
and enjoy the economic benefits or try to keep or recruit a professional
franchise or collegiate tournament.168
Recently, both Delaware and Oregon—two of the four states that were
granted a partial exemption from PASPA—weighed these economic alterna-
tives, and each state made a different choice.169  In 2005, the Oregon legisla-
ture passed House Bill 3466 eliminating their sports lottery at the conclusion of
the 2006-2007 NFL season.170  The Oregon Lottery abolished the lottery in an
effort to attract NCAA tournaments to the state.171  The Lottery further stated
that, “the bill’s proponents pointed to the potential revenue that could be gener-
ated in the state by people from throughout the country traveling to Oregon to
attend these NCAA basketball games, particularly the men’s games.”172  The
Oregon Lottery claimed they were eliminating the sports lottery even though it
was “very successful, having posted all-time sales records the past two years,”
because “the NCAA had said as long as there were sports betting games being
offered in Oregon, they would not permit a site in Oregon to host an NCAA
165 In early 2008 for example, Oklahoma City citizens approved a $121.6 million sales tax
extension for improvements to their downtown arena, and the state legislature passed a law
issuing $60 million in payroll tax exemptions over the next 15 years, in an effort to attract
the NBA’s Seattle Supersonics franchise to their state. OKLA. H. R., APPROPRIATIONS OVER-
VIEW (2009) at 7, available at http://www.okhouse.gov/Documents/Appropriation-
sProcessFY2009.pdf.  The legislature stated that “the presence of an NBA team in the state
will result in increases in sales, income, and ad valorem tax revenue . . .” Id.
166 See Markell Letter, supra note 124.
167 ASSOC. PRESS, NFL, NCAA oppose Del. gambling bill, ESPN.COM, (Mar. 27, 2009 3:34
AM), http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/news/story?id=4019996 (NCAA spokeswoman Stacey
Osburn asserts that, “NCAA policy prohibits the staging of any session of an NCAA cham-
pionship in any metropolitan area where legal sports wagering is allowed”).
168 See id.
169 See supra Part II.B.3.
170 H.R. 3466, 73d Leg., 2005 Oregon Laws Ch. 810 (Or. 2005).
171 Carla “KC” Hanson, Oregon Sports Action Laid to Rest, BLUEOREGON (Feb. 9, 2007),
http://www.blueoregon.com/2007/02/oregon_sports_a (The 2005 Legislature overwhelm-
ingly voted to abolish Sports Action, hoping to encourage the NCAA to end its Oregon
freeze-out.).
172 Id.
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men’s or women’s basketball tournament game.”173  Given the choice between
keeping their successful sports lottery and hosting the NCAA college basketball
tournament, Oregon chose the latter.174
Conversely, Delaware chose to legalize sports betting, even in the face of
vehement opposition and threats from the sports leagues.175  Although Dela-
ware is not a likely destination for a professional sports franchise, the NCAA
threatened to ban all collegiate playoff games in Delaware if the state legalized
sports betting.176  Nevertheless, Delaware approved state-sponsored sports bet-
ting in May 2009, anticipating millions of dollars in revenue.177
The powerful lobbying forces of the professional and amateur sports
leagues can exert a tremendous amount of influence on sports gambling legisla-
tion.178  This power stands as another check on PASPA’s incorrect assumption
that legalized sports gambling will spread through an “irreversible momentum”
across the U.S.179  It is more likely that allowing state-sanctioned sports gam-
bling would result in a trickle of legalization at the state level, instead of a
flood.
B. The Economic Benefits of Legalized Sports Gambling
Legalized sports gambling can be extremely profitable.  After analyzing
the various economic benefits of legalized sports gambling, this section con-
cludes that state and local governments would likely experience an increase in
tax revenue, job creation, and greater economic activity from sports gambling’s
“crossover effects,” if they chose to legalize the activity.
1. Tax Revenues from Sports Gambling
Lawmakers have three basic options when regulating vices like sports
gambling: (1) ban the activity and appropriate significant resources to combat
the ill in an attempt to fully or substantially eradicate it; (2) permit existing
piecemeal legislation to remain on the books while putting few, if any,
resources behind the enforcement of those laws; or (3) legalize, regulate, and
tax the activity.180  Though the second option reflects the status quo, it is
becoming apparent that the third option may be the preferred policy choice of
some cash-strapped state governments.181  As the Missouri House of Repre-
sentatives argued in its January 2010 Concurrent Resolution:
[T]he federal sports wagering ban is not effective in curbing illegal sports gambling,
so that lifting the ban on sports wagering would allow state gaming enforcement
agencies to properly regulate and police this activity . . . Missouri would benefit
173 Id.
174 See id.
175 Markell Letter, supra note 124; ASSOC. PRESS, supra note 167.
176 ASSOC. PRESS, supra note 167.
177 See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
178 See Markell Letter, supra note 124; see also ASSOC. PRESS, supra note 167.
179 S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 5 (1992).
180 DAVIES & ABRAM, supra note 22, at 167 (citing William Eadington, Comments before
National Association of Athletic Directors (June 15, 1999) (summary available in NCAA
News, July 5, 1999)).
181 See supra Part II.B.3.
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significantly from an end to the federal ban, as sports wagering in this state would be
subject to the existing gambling taxes in Missouri, thereby generating more income
for the State of Missouri[.]182
Choosing a workable tax rate is integral to having a successful legal sport-
sbook because too high of a tax can make a sportsbook unprofitable and drive
the activity out of the law’s watchful eye.183  Congress learned this lesson in
the 1950s when it taxed gambling revenues at a ten-percent rate.184  Eventually
the federal government lowered the tax, which allowed state-sponsored sports
betting in Nevada to take hold.185  Currently, Nevada levies a 6.5% tax on
gross gambling revenue,186 and local governments add on an additional one-
percent tax.187  Though Delaware never officially announced an effective tax
rate for their proposed sports betting system, the initial proposal indicated that
the state could run a profitable venture if it split proceeds with vendors
equally.188  Delaware defends its system as a profitable source of revenue, hav-
ing collected $830,000 in the system’s first three months of operation.189
Though this number is not likely to make a dent in the budget deficit, it is
indicative of the vast amount of potential tax revenue the state could collect if it
were allowed to fully legalize sports gambling.
Until recently, the United Kingdom had a robust sports betting industry.190
A number of private-sector companies, some trading on national stock
exchanges, continue to offer sports betting within the UK and generate billions
of dollars a year in revenue.191  The UK historically taxed these companies at
high rates—a fifteen percent tax on gross profits, a fifteen percent value added
tax (VAT), and the standard corporate tax.192  In 2002 alone, the UK collected
nearly $700 million in revenue from sports betting companies.193  Recently
though, some UK-based companies ditched their land-based operations and
moved to offshore islands to enjoy the friendlier tax laws, cutting off a large
182 Missouri Resolution, supra note 81.
183 See DAVIES & ABRAM, supra note 22, at 122-27.
184 Id. at 122; RICHARD A. MCGOWAN, THE GAMBLING DEBATE 57 (2008).
185 DAVIES & ABRAM, supra note 22, at 127-28.
186 As defined by the American Gaming Association, “Gross Gambling Revenue (GGR) is
the amount wagered minus the winnings returned to players, a true measure of the economic
value of gambling. GGR is the figure used to determine what a . . . gaming operation earns
before taxes, salaries and other expenses are paid — the equivalent of “sales” not “profit.”
Fact Sheets, General Info, Gaming Revenue: 10-Year Trends, AM. GAMING ASS’N, available
at http://www.americangaming.org/Industry/factsheets/general_info_detail.cfv?id=Select%
20a%20Factsheet (last visited Feb 5, 2011).
187 MCGOWAN, supra note 184, at 57.
188 DELAWARE SPORTS BETTING REPORT, supra note 2, at 2-3.
189 Tom Byrne, Delaware Sports Betting Beats Revenue Projection, WHYY NEWS AND
INFO. (Dec. 1, 2009), http://whyy.org/cms/news/government-politics/2009/12/01/delaware-
sports-betting-beats-revenue-projection/24384.
190 Drape, supra note 8, at A1; see also Bill Wilson, Sports Betting Industry Looks to Pro-
tect Itself, BBC.CO.UK, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-11309620.
191 See also Wilson, supra note 190.
192 Press Release, Ladbrokes PLC, Ladbrokes Sportsbook Relocates Ahead of Schedule
(Mar. 11, 2009), http://www.ladbrokesplc.com/media-centre/press-releases/releases-2009/
2009-11-03.aspx.
193 MCGOWAN, supra note 184, at 58 (citing Jason Pawlina, Betting on College Sports:
Nevada vs. The Others, Insight, Christiansen Capital Advisors, LLC, May 29, 2003).
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source of tax revenue for the UK government.194  The experience highlights the
importance of targeting a workable tax rate, something U.S. state policymakers
must consider when formulating their own policies.
Immediately prior to PASPA’s passage, the United States was going
through another recession.  Like today, state governments were ridden with
debt and gaping budget deficits, prompting a number of sports gambling propo-
nents to lobby governments to legalize and tax sports betting.195  In September
of 1991, William Johnson of Sports Illustrated inquired as to “why we have
been so stupid as to leave [a] lucrative and hugely popular segment of sport to
the Mob and the office pool for so long[?]”196  He bemoaned that sports gam-
bling profits are “all . . . under-the-table money, no more available to the tax
man than were the millions in bootleg liquor profits during Prohibition or are
the Colombian cartels’ take from the sale of cocaine in America today.”197
Like Governor Markell today, Johnson argued twenty years ago:
[t]hirty states have budget deficits, some of them catastrophic . . . [h]owever, only a
handful of states allow wagering on sports events . . . taxing 100% of our sports
gambling action would bring in billions of dollars.  Those billions might not solve all
the woes of our various insolvent state governments, but they couldn’t hurt.198
“Billions of dollars” may be a significant exaggeration, and accurately
predicting actual tax revenues is rather difficult given the myriad of factors one
must consider.  Nevertheless, Johnson’s larger point still rings true almost
twenty years later.  The NGISC Report estimates that approximately $380 bil-
lion a year is illegally wagered on sporting events.199  Widespread legalization
of sports betting would presumably drive a significant portion of “under-
ground” gamblers to legal venues.200  Assuming, for argument’s sake, that the
entire $380 billion could be legally wagered in the United States and that 4.6%
of total wagers are kept by the sportsbook operator (i.e., the gross gambling
revenue), legal sportsbooks would gross approximately $17.48 billion nation-
wide, to be taxed and distributed at appropriate levels to state and local govern-
ments.201  This number is a best-case and speculative scenario, but it is
demonstrative of the vast amount of untapped tax revenue of which states such
as Delaware are in desperate need.
2. Other Increases In Economic Activity
Because the full range of legalized sports betting exists only in Nevada, it
is difficult to ascertain what kind of broader economic impact more widespread
legalization could have.  The NGISC Report stated that “[b]ecause sports
wagering is illegal in most states, it does not . . . contribute to local economies
194 Graeme Wearden, Ladbrokes Confirms Gibraltar Move for Online Gambling, GUARD-
IAN.CO.UK, (Aug. 6, 2009 10:34 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/aug/06/lad-
brokes-online-gaming-moves-gibraltar.
195 See e.g. William Oscar Johnson, A Sure Bet to Lower Debt, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept.
2, 1991, at 20.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 NGISC REPORT, supra note 7, at 2-14.
200 MCGOWAN, supra note 184, at 56-57.
201 See id.
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and produces few jobs.”202  However, like tax revenue predictions, Nevada can
be a comparable economic case study for states considering legalization.
Besides tax revenue, the most direct economic impact legalized sports
wagering would have is job creation.  The Department of Labor estimates that
“gaming and sports book writers and runners” accounted for 14,790 jobs
nationwide in 2009, the vast majority of which were employed in Nevada.203
These workers’ median annual wage was almost $23,460 a year.204  With the
United Stated unemployment rate hovering around ten percent, and a higher
rate in many states, legalized sports gambling can help soften the economic
misery.
Legalized sports wagering also has measurable “crossover effects.”205
The crossover effect assumes that either: (1) sports bettors would play other
games while at the legal sportsbook; (2) sports bettors would bring other people
with them to play other games at the casino;206 and/or (3) sports bettors or their
guests would purchase food, beverage, or hotel accommodations while gam-
bling.207  Las Vegas sportsbook experts “conservatively estimate” a ten percent
increase in slot machine play attributable to an adjacent sportsbook.208  A por-
tion of Delaware’s $50-$100 million revenue projection assumes a crossover
effect to the state-run racinos (combined race track casino) and higher food and
beverage sales at state-run venues.209  Delaware envisions allowing a number
of privately owned venues throughout the state, such as sports bars, to sell
sports betting tickets, which the state would also tax.210
Currently, Nevada has a virtual monopoly on legalized sports betting and
other states want a piece of the economic pie.211  Nevada may be opposed to a
change in the status quo, though it is unclear whether it would actually be
adversely affected by widespread legalization.  On the one hand, Nevada would
lose its near monopolistic control of the industry.212  However, only one per-
cent of national sports gambling activity is wagered in Nevada sportsbooks.213
It is more likely that the nationwide pie would grow larger with more states
sanctioning the activity, bringing a large portion of the current illegal bets
within legal play.214  Nevada would still remain the gambling capital of
America, so it would only risk losing those gamblers who travel to the state
202 NGISC REPORT, supra note 7, at 2-14.
203 See Occupational Employment and Wages for Gaming and Sports Book Writers and
Runners, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR: BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, May 2008, available at
http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes393012.htm.  Besides employees who work at casino
sportsbooks, this number also includes employees who assist in the operation of games such
as keno and bingo, and thus is slightly overstated for purposes of this Note. Id.
204 Id.
205 DELAWARE SPORTS BETTING REPORT, supra note 2, at 12-13.
206 Id. at 12.
207 See Millman, supra note 1.
208 Id.
209 Millman, supra note 1.
210 Id.
211 See supra Part III.B.3.
212 See supra Part III.B.3.
213 See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
214 See supra notes 2-10 and accompanying text.
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solely to gamble on sports.215  Thus, the adverse effects on Nevada’s economy
are likely minimal.
Governor Markell sought to legalize sports gambling and make Delaware
the only state “east of The Mississippi” to offer the activity,216 allowing gam-
blers on the east coast to legally bet on sports without having to take a cross
country trip to Nevada.  More states have now gotten into the act and are look-
ing to spread the sports gambling pie across the country.217
C. Greater Transparency In Detecting Sports Gambling Misconduct
Many proponents of legalized sports betting argue that by legalizing the
activity, authorities will be better positioned to combat athlete or referee fraud
or misconduct.  With widespread legalization, sports betting could actually
become more transparent, which would enable sporting and enforcement offi-
cials to detect and address possible signs of wrongdoing.218
It is a federal crime to knowingly “carr[y] into effect, attempt[ ] to carry
into effect or conspire[ ] with any other person to carry into effect any
scheme . . . to influence, in any way, by bribery any sporting contest.”219  There
are dozens of known instances of such bribery in American professional and
collegiate sports history, constantly shaking the integrity of organized sport.220
Not all instances are ultimately uncovered, so it is difficult to accurately assess
how widespread the phenomenon is,221 though the aforementioned Donaghy
215 See Chad Millman, It Only Takes One, ESPN.COM, (Dec. 16, 2009 12:22 PM), http://
insider.espn.go.com/insider/insider/news/story?id=4747561 (quoting NBA Commissioner
David Stern as stating that, “Las Vegas is a vacation and destination resort, and they have
sports gambling [as well]”).
216 Millman, supra note 1.
217 See supra Part III.B.3.
218 Drape, supra note 8, at A1 (Over a seven-year period, online gambling web site BetFair
has called attention to suspicious betting activity in dozens of sports, prompting investiga-
tions regarding gambling cheating schemes in horse racing, soccer, and tennis.).
219 18 U.S.C. § 224 (2006).
220 See e.g. Michael McCarthy, Point-shaving Remains a Concern in College Athletics,
USA TODAY, (May 9, 2007 4:06 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/2007-05-08-
point-shaving-cover_N.htm (discussing allegations of point-shaving against University of
Toledo running back Harvey “Scooter” McDougle Jr. and listing five point-shaving scandals
from college basketball that have occurred in the last 60 years.).
221 Recently, Professor Justin Wolfers from the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton
School of Business reviewed sixteen years of college basketball results, and found that
“point shaving” had occurred in about 1 percent of the games.  Drape, supra note 8, at A1,
A12.  Point shaving is where an athlete ensures his team does not cover the point spread, in
return for money or gifts from a sports bettor. Id. at A12.  In 2005, the NCAA released a
survey they conducted amongst student-athletes that “found that 35 percent of male athletes
and 10 percent of female athletes said they had bet on college sports in the previous year,
[while] 1.1 percent of Division I football and .5 percent of Division I men’s basketball
players reported accepting money for playing poorly in a game.” Id. Additionally, “2.3 per-
cent of the Division I football players and 2.1 percent of the Division I men’s basketball
players surveyed said they had been asked to influence the outcome of a game because of
gambling debts, and 1.4 percent of the football players and 1 percent of the basketball play-
ers acknowledged actually affecting the outcome.” Id. Professor Wolfers said there was
more potential for corruption in American sports, since more money was bet illegally and
without regulation. Id.
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scandal is just the latest example.222  A very small percentage of sports betting
takes place legally in the United States today, so it is extremely difficult to
detect whether any specific player, team, or game is attracting more than the
usual amount of betting activity.223  Outsiders looking to influence the outcome
of a sporting event through athlete or referee bribery are not likely to place their
bets in Nevada and risk being detected.224
If legalized sports betting spreads, enforcement officials should be able to
better detect unusual betting patterns.225  Although critics often speculate that
legalized sports betting will lead to “easy money” and widespread bribery, elec-
tronic computer tracking has proven that it may now be possible to track suspi-
cious activity.226  Betfair, an England-based website, has detected match-fixing
scandals in a number of local sporting events due to the heavy volume of bet-
ting its website accepts and monitors.227  Betfair has successfully brought a
degree of transparency to sports betting and has increased accountability by
supplying real-time information to the thirty-two governing bodies it cooper-
ates with.228  The system, as set up, works much the way insider trading inves-
tigations work in the financial markets: the greater the market’s informational
liquidity, the easier it should be to detect fraud and manipulation.229  Las Vegas
Sports Consultants Inc. (“LVSC”) has adopted Betfair’s approach in the United
States by monitoring suspicious betting activity.230  LVSC sets betting lines for
sporting events, but it also has developed a system to detect “unusual” patterns
which could be indicative of possible misconduct.231  LVSC passes this infor-
mation onto enforcement and sporting officials.232  However, LVSC’s system
is only effective at detecting bets placed in Las Vegas casinos; it cannot prop-
erly monitor online betting on American sports because it cannot view individ-
ual online bets, and it is incapable of monitoring bets placed with bookies.233
If PASPA were repealed and sports gambling were widespread, a system would
be in place all around the country to detect any unusual gambling patterns on
all American sporting events.234
222 See Thomsen, supra note 130.
223 See Tamara Audi & Adam Thompson, Oddsmakers In Vegas Play New Sports Role,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2007, at A1.
224 See id. (Sources in Las Vegas say they didn’t pick up irregularities in this summer’s
NBA refereeing case, speculating that wagers on the games may not have been large enough
to influence betting lines or that bets were placed outside Nevada.).
225 See id. (In September 2005, Las Vegas Sports Consultants Inc., which advises casinos
on sporting events, became suspicious of bets associated with the University of Toledo and
alerted the Nevada Gaming Control Board.  In March 2007, the FBI reportedly uncovered a
gambling cheating scheme involving a University of Toledo football player.).
226 Drape, supra note 8, at A1.
227 Id.
228 Id. at A12.
229 See id.
230 Audi & Thompson, supra note 223, at A1 (“We can tell you every single bet ever placed
and who made it, from what funds and where those funds are going . . . It is a complete audit
trail, and we want to share it with the governing bodies of sports.”).
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 DAVIES & ABRAM, supra note 22, at 156.
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V. CONCLUSION
Proponents of PASPA may have believed that the statute was a laudable
piece of legislation in 1992, but it is now evident that the law ultimately fell
short of its professed goals while simultaneously restricting state and local gov-
ernments from pursuing valuable sources of revenue and economic activity.
Regardless of whether one criticizes or supports legalized sports gambling, eve-
ryone agrees that the activity is more widespread and popular in the United
States than ever before.235  American sports bettors gamble billions of untaxed
dollars a year with illegal bookies and websites, while the states are restricted
from legalizing the activity, a policy that hurts everyone involved except those
profiting from breaking the law.
The federal government has historically been better at policing interstate
violations of state sports gambling laws than at prohibiting the activity alto-
gether from the federal level.236  Whether the prohibition in its current form is
even constitutional is a separate issue that this Note has only briefly touched
upon but one that the New Jersey District Court is now contemplating.237
Repealing PASPA would lead to some states fully or partially legalizing sports
gambling, but it would certainly not lead to an avalanche of legalization across
the United States given the existing economic, social, political, legal, and con-
stitutional hurdles.238  The Wire Act enables the federal government to ensure
that no interstate violations of state laws take place, so that citizens in states
that prohibit sports gambling cannot place sports bets in legal states through the
telephone and Internet.239  This system gives the states the sovereign freedom
to choose whether to legalize sports gambling—a freedom that traditionally
was always theirs—while using the federal government’s power to ensure that
all state laws are upheld and enforced.
Delaware’s recent partial legalization, New Jersey and Iowa’s recent legis-
lative activity, the failed federal lawsuit in U.S. District Court in New Jersey,
and Missouri and Rhode Islands’ recently proposed symbolic resolutions all
indicate two increasingly obvious realities.240  First, all of these states are
starved for cash and are looking to sports gambling as a new and potentially
lucrative source of tax revenue, job growth, and economic activity.241  Second,
all of these states are dissatisfied with PASPA and want it repealed.242  The
pleas and demands for a repeal will grow louder until the federal government is
finally forced to confront the situation.  Hopefully, Congress or the federal
courts will recognize that PASPA (1) has failed to accomplish what it set out to
do, (2) continues to support a thriving shadow economy of mob-associated
bookies and offshore websites, (3) unfairly restricts the sovereignty and eco-
235 See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
236 See supra Part II.
237 For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Thomas P. Colbey, Revitalzing the Forgotten
Uniformity Constraint on the Commerce Power, 91 U. VA. L. REV. 249 (2005).
238 See supra Part IV.A.
239 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2006).
240 See supra Part II.B.
241 See supra Part IV.B.
242 See supra Part II.B.
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nomic freedom of the states, and (4) makes detecting possible athlete and refe-
ree bribery more difficult.243  PASPA is a bad bet that is no longer worth
gambling on.
243 See supra Parts III-IV.
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